OK, but what if someone starts sending BGP traffic to random internet routers and tries to get them to route traffic wrongly? Each network provider maintains a list of other network providers it will take BGP updates from.
These lists comprise of large tech companies, ISPs, and some governments. A BGP misconfiguration in one of these key providers will cause affected blocks of the internet to no longer be able to route traffic, effectively disconnecting them from the wider internet.
"But this will never happen at large" in 2008 a Pakistani ISP attempted to use a BGP route to block Pakistani users from visiting YouTube and accidentally advertised it to neighbouring ISPs causing users in other regions to be unable to access Youtube.
In 2014 an attacker used "BGP hijacking" to redirect connections from mining pools to a node they controlled, causing miners to unknowingly mine for the attacker. This was caused by a Canadian ISP being hacked to supply the wrong BGP data.
In 2018 MyEtherWallet was targeted, causing traffic to instead be routed to a phishing website.
Yes I know the above examples targeted specific services and not crypto/p2p networks as a whole, but there's always pressure points that such an attack could target....
...such as mining pools, or it could just blanket offline entire geographic regions. The internet is surprisingly fragile and resilient systems need to consider alternative means of communication. I'll give Bitcoin this: the block stream satellite is a step in the right...
I'm excited about 'transport blind' P2P libraries like libp2p, allows us to experiment and build alternative transport infrastructure like bluetooth mesh networking.
See for some cool examples: